Doubleness in Experience: Toward a Distributed Enactive Approach to Metaphoricity

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A new concept of cognition also implies a novel approach to the study of metaphor. This insight is the starting point of this article presenting two innovations to comprehending and analyzing metaphor, one theoretical and one in terms of methodology. On a theoretical level we argue for a new orientation to metaphor and metaphoricity based on enactive cognition and distributed language and cognition. In recent years enactive and distributed cognition have been developing a new concept of cognition as an inter-bodily and ecologically afforded achievement, and in light of this theoretical development we propose an approach to metaphor as a multi-body, multi-party, and multi-timescale phenomenon. On a methodological level we demonstrate a new way of analyzing metaphoricity in multimodal social interaction based on in-depth video analyses of two real life examples in which we introduce metaphorical identification criteria focusing on doubleness in meaning, affordances for co-action, co-ordination, and co-experience. Here metaphoricity is explored as a distinct and emergent aspect of the coordination processes that constitute social interaction. In the final section we point to the general findings of the analyses and discuss the challenges that conceptual metaphor theory faces in the light of the new tendencies within cognitive science as well as a possible way forward.

Is metaphor research catching the latest waves in cognitive science? Or will metaphors be swept out to sea?

The logic of cognitive linguistics holds that best current knowledge about cognition should inform theoretical and experimental pursuit of language, concepts, and categories (and by extension, experiences of the world). “Cognitive Linguistics sees language as embedded in the overall cognitive capacities of man” (Geeraerts & Cuyckens, 2007, p. 4).

Today a new take on cognition is gaining ground. Sometimes called the “third wave” in cognitive science, or “4-E” approaches to cognition, a major unifying feature of these recent trends is an emphasis on the social and interactive nature of cognition, which sees “cognition as not
just embodied but distributed, embedded, enacted and situated as well. Cognition is no longer reserved to the individual mind—as has been the tradition in Western thinking for millennia—but is now transcending the boundaries of the skull” (Jensen, 2013, p. 2). What does this evolution in understanding and treatment of human cognitive capacities imply for one of the most fundamental areas of cognitive linguistics research: the study of metaphor?

Since Lakoff and Johnson’s 1980 watershed publication *Metaphors We Live By*, which largely ushered in second-generation cognitive science and its definitive focus on embodiment, metaphor has been studied as a psychologically real process of mapping between conceptual domains (Gibbs, 2011; Gibbs & Colston, 1995; Gibbs & Santa Cruz, 2012a, 2012b). Image schematic structure of domains comes from embodied experiences in the world (M. Johnson, 1987); logical entailments of cross-domain mappings both presuppose and contribute to real-world know-how (Lakoff & Johnson, 1999, pp. 46–47). Conceptual metaphor theory (CMT)’s initial force and bulk of experimental findings focused on individual cognitive processes, eventually centering on sub-personal neural mechanisms (e.g., Feldman, 2006; Feldman et al., 1996; Lakoff, 2008; Narayanan, 1997; Regier, 1996).

Now a new tide is rising. Metaphor scholarship is advancing beyond its original research focus on cross-domain conceptualization in individual cognition to emergent experiencing in dynamic social interactions. One crucial such shift is from targeting metaphor to *metaphoricity*: “metaphors as the outcome of the process of establishing metaphoricity” (Müller, 2008, p. 26). The present article follows this direction. It builds on observations from applied linguistics that “researching metaphor in language use often seems to lead to confrontation with the assumptions and claims of conceptual metaphor theory” (Cameron, 2007, p. 108). The predefined notions of source and target domains are not always so easy to locate, often “conceptual metaphors look different from what people actually say or write” (Cameron, 2007, p. 108), sometimes “they use only part of domains” (Cameron, 2007, p. 108), at other times the double meaning of certain verbal actions is as much in the behavior as in the words themselves. Ultimately, if the vantage point is interactional data and these data are taken seriously, we might need to reconsider the notion of metaphor: “a metaphor is no longer a static fixed mapping, but a temporary stability emerging from the activity of inter-connecting systems of socially situated language use and cognitive activity” (Cameron et al., 2009, p. 4). Due to these empirical findings, and due to our commitment to distributed and enactive cognition, we propose that in real-life cases of interaction the alternative process-oriented notion of metaphoricity is likely to be *more fundamental and operative* than metaphor, and thus in need of closer examination in a manner different from that of traditional metaphor research. In that sense our approach can be seen as a new step in the direction of developing and re-thinking CMT as laid out by Raymond Gibbs:

Nevertheless, in my view CMT suffers from several enduring problems that require both different kinds of empirical data and a more explicit openness to alternative theories than presently found in CMT scholarship. Simply collecting more data relevant to conceptual metaphors—as cognitive linguistics primarily has been done—will not solve the problem that critics raise. Things need to be done differently in the future. (Gibbs, 2014, p. 17)

In order to stay relevant as a cutting-edge discipline—and this is said with great appreciation and reverence of the merits of CMT—modern metaphor research needs to incorporate insights from the new waves in cognitive science; in that respect this article can be seen as an (initial) attempt to do things differently.
THE SOCIAL-DYNAMIC TURN IN METAPHOR STUDIES

We take the recent and significant shift to social, interactive, and dynamic approaches to metaphoricity in real-life face-to-face discourse situations as an invitation to develop an experience-oriented methodology for identifying and analyzing metaphoricity as a special kind of interpersonal, inter-bodily, and inter-affective meaning coordination. New ways of researching metaphor as dynamic on-line enactments (Gibbs, 2005, 2011; Gibbs & Santa Cruz, 2012b) or activations (Müller, 2008; Müller & Tag, 2010) of metaphor in discourse (Cameron, 1999, 2007) collectively pave a way forward to a social-cognitive perspective on metaphor.

In capturing the embodied and social dimensions of conceptual metaphor during people’s real-time conceptualizations and utterances, a dynamical systems approach appears particularly well-suited (Gibbs, 2005; Gibbs & Santa Cruz, 2012b). This perspective enables us to see “...conceptual metaphor as an emergent phenomenon that arises from the interaction of numerous constraints operating at different time scales, ranging from slow moving evolutionary and cultural forces to fast moving cognitive and neural processes” (Gibbs, 2011; Gibbs & Santa Cruz, 2012b, p. 304). The application of dynamical systems concepts and terminology to metaphor allows for a non-static and non-individualistic understanding of cross-domain cognitive mappings and metaphorical utterance interpretation (Gibbs, 2011, p. 553; Gibbs & Santa Cruz, 2012b, p. 309). Gibbs also indicates a number of empirical implications of this approach, including an explanatory framework for the non-linear, uneven emergence of metaphor in speaking and gesturing over a stretch of discourse (see Gibbs & Cameron, 2008).

Cornelia Müller (2007, 2008) articulates a dynamic view of metaphor according to which “metaphor activation is both an interactive and individual process” (Müller & Tag, 2010, p. 85). As developed in the paradigm of Metaphor Foregrounding Analysis (Müller & Tag, 2010), participants co-generate available (perceptible) multi-modal markers of salience. Metaphoricity can be observed as being more or less activated according to the presence, amount, and degree of foregrounding of these salience markers. Participants may foreground metaphoricity by for example gesturing with large movements “in the focal attentional space of speaker and hearer” such that they are unlikely to be missed or ignored (Müller & Tag, 2010, p. 95). “When metaphoricity is foregrounded, we assume that is also activated—interactively, cognitively and affectively” (Müller & Tag, 2010, p. 87). We are inspired by Müller and Tag’s use of attention dynamism and affective processes; in what follows, we interpret these components of metaphoricity in terms of experiential consequences afforded by events in interactivity. That is, we find metaphoricity emerging from the dynamics between people interacting and not only between different modalities in individual speakers.

The present work is buoyed by these crucial sea-changes in conceptualizing and analyzing metaphoricity, yet in both theoretical and empirical aspects, we chart a course into deeper waters. For example, in what follows we are in complete agreement with Gibbs and Santa Cruz (2012b) when they argue for the possibility of “joint metaphoric understanding,” meaning, or concepts achieved not as “properties of individual minds” but rather as “higher-order products of the coupling among two or more individuals” (p. 309). However, we also advance on this view by seeking to identify shared metaphorical meaning as interactively afforded in naturalistic, non-experimental data. Furthermore, coming from our integrated distributed-enactive view, metaphoricity is not an expression of underlying cognition or a “window” onto “the mind”; it is cognizing body-minds in action as they coordinate possibilities for co-experience.
By broadening the scope of metaphoricity to collaborative and whole-body communicative-cognitive behavior, we find ourselves better situated to investigate the experiential aspects of metaphor. In the kinds of settings we explore—namely, real-life face-to-face encounters in institutional environments—cognizing is an inter-enactive, distributed process.

TOWARD AN ENACTIVE AND DISTRIBUTED PERSPECTIVE ON METAPHORICITY

The enactive, participatory, and distributed perspective on cognition can philosophically integrate contemporary claims about multimodality, interaction, and temporal dynamics; it can offer operational identifying and analytical criteria that are fully in tune with new metaphor research commitments. These accounts push us to understand human thinking, meaning-making and experiencing as fundamentally co-authored, ecological, and active (in the sense of bodily doing and sensing).

We are inspired by the notion of interactivity that describes phases of “sense-saturated coordination that contributes to human action” (Steffensen, 2013, p. 196), and as De Jaegher and Di Paolo (2007) also note, this dynamic event of coordination generates its own patterns that inform the roles and actions of participants in it. Humans interacting in conversation, for example, constitute dialogical systems, which “are systems of co-present human beings engaged in interactivity that bring forth situated behavioral coordination (or a communicative, structural coupling).” Dialogical systems, however, have emergent properties irreducible to individual actions or microsocial norms” (Steffensen, 2012, p. 513).

According to participatory sense-making, attending to coordination allows us to study social interaction as a phenomenon in its own right, with its own autonomy and hence sense-making processes. In dialogical interaction, then, “individual sense-making processes are affected and new domains of social sense-making can be generated that were not available to each individual on her own” (De Jaegher & Di Paolo, 2007, p. 497). However, the shift in cognitive science from individual to social epistemology has not previously been stated in its most explicit or consequential terms vis-à-vis metaphor scholarship. Thus, the new trends in cognitive science (distributed cognition, participatory sense-making) still lack systematic treatments of metaphoricity as a higher-order interactional sense-making phenomenon. We believe that, by incorporating the insights of distributed language and participatory sense-making, we can advance upon the example set by Gibbs, Müller, Cameron, and others, and lay some new ground for explaining the role of metaphoricity in intersubjective meaning-making. Thus, in what follows, we examine how metaphoricity contributes to the way that coordinations maintain themselves or break down (see also De Jaegher & Di Paolo, 2007, p. 492). Attending to metaphoricity as a specific kind of coordinating process allows for the analysis of finely tuned changes in what is available in experience and co-experience as a result of collaborative or distributed sense-making.

Perhaps the most radical difference the enactive-distributed perspective makes is the introduction of a broad notion of “languaging” as whole-body sense-making activity that takes place only in socially and semiotically structured environments (Bottineau, 2010; Maturana, 1978; Thibault, 2011). We follow Chafe (1994), Linell (2005), Kravchenko (2007) and others in distinguishing between spoken and written language as different kinds of linguistic sense-making that ultimately involve different kinds of cognition, different ways of thinking and acting; these come with different requirements and affordances in each case. Our analyses focus on first-order languaging
behavior (Thibault, 2011), which includes wordings and vocal gestures but is fundamentally multimodal and whole-body dialogical activity, situated in the “here and now” that is constituted by multiple timescales. Second-order language, by contrast, is the idea of language as a cognitive artifact, a system of symbols that is the product or sediment of first-order languaging activity (Thibault, 2011). While in our analyses we take a principled stance in avoiding conflation of different kinds of language whenever possible, the point is not that in actual experience and interaction these two orders come apart so neatly. The commonly learned second-order language shows up in the flow of first-order languaging, shaping and constraining the possibilities for sense-making therein, though not exhaustively determining or explaining them. The interplay of orders and kinds of languaging constitute sources of doubleness.

DOUBLENESS IN INTERACTIVE EVENTS AND EXPERIENCE

Like Müller, Cameron, and Gibbs, we begin from a complex interactive perspective. Following from participatory and distributed explanations of sense-making, we attempt to include experience as it occurs and is afforded within interaction, specifically by the particular coordinating processes of metaphoricity.\footnote{It is crucial to note that Gibbs’ recent development of a dynamic systems approach to metaphor also features experience; for example, Gibbs and Santa Cruz (2012b) suggest that “conceptual metaphors are not static representational entities existing only at the cognitive level, but are stabilities in experience that are emergent products of the human self-organized system” (p. 304).}

As Lakoff and Johnson (1980) famously noted, experience is integral to what metaphor is all about: “The essence of metaphor is understanding and experiencing one kind of thing in terms of another” (p. 5). Experience explains the meaning of meaning. In later work Mark Johnson (2007) defines meaning in terms of consequences in experience; meaning “concerns the character or significance of a person’s interactions with their environments” (p. 10). The notion of consequences points us to relationality as the core of meaning—relationality between individual and environment; between the past, present, and future; between background and foreground; between old and new. According to Eugene Gendlin (1962), metaphor happens when “a new kind of relationship with ‘symbolization’ is established—now no longer between a felt meaning and symbols, but between a complex of felt meaning and symbols on the one hand, and some new felt meaning on the other” (p. 115).

In line with our enactive-distributed paradigm, we interpret Gendlin’s notion of “symbol” to refer to a co-available felt sense of what we are doing and what is possible in the conversational interaction as it unfolds; “symbolization” is the enaction of languaging as it shapes meaning experience. Symbols on a distributed-enactive understanding of languaging are not just words spoken but significant behaviors that serve in the moment to mark, capture, constrain, organize, and redirect the experiential flow.\footnote{See also Rączaszek-Leonardi (2012).} When we can identify more than one experiential affordance (felt sense or felt meaning) being opened or made room for in what follows, the affording behavioral coordination has metaphoricity. The transition from the complex of felt sense and symbol (significant behavior) on one hand, to the new sense on the other, might be the relation between old
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and new, familiar and unexpected, present and absent, or it could be the experience of merging or layering multiple perspectives or roles.

In using doubleness as a measure of metaphoricity, we thus mean the term to pick out meaningful contrasts, tensions, or multiplicities, which may occur at either of two levels—at the interactional level of events and affordances, and at the individual level of changes in experience.

DEFINING METAPHORICITY

We claim that metaphoricity arises and acts as a special type of coordination process at moments of multiplicity in meaning. Metaphoricity emerges as doubleness that reorganizes interactional dynamics such that new experiences become available for participants. What makes metaphoricity a distinct and identifiable type of coordination process are its features of doubleness. Features of doubleness include contrast, multiplicity, instability, affective ambivalence or contradiction, and swells in dialogical system activity across modalities (cf. Müller, 2008; activation cues).

Thus the following analyses examine how metaphoricity emerges within dialogical systems with a specific focus on doubleness in meaning and affordances for co-action, co-ordination, and co-experience. Our attempt to operationalize the notion of doubleness in the following sections is made in support of the following theoretical claims:

1. Metaphoricity is the kind of coordination process that emerges as an organizational response to multiplicity in co-enacted meanings.
2. Metaphoricity shapes or constrains competing dimensions of felt sense (experience) (in these moments of multiplicity), guiding the system towards an available (more shareable) experience.
   a. Metaphoricity is assumed to be more fundamental and more operative than metaphor when the target of analysis is languaging interactions (e.g., rather than texts).\(^3\)
   b. If metaphoricity is successful or continues to organize the interactional sequence, participants move together towards a changed meaning (the “contrast” or “non-literal” sense of traditional metaphor theory) as in Gibbs’ attractor basins that dialogue creates (see Gibbs, 2011; Gibbs & Cameron, 2008; Gibbs & Santa Cruz, 2012b).
   c. If metaphoricity is not successful, then the interaction sequence has no detectable change.

\(^3\)Such a claim will of course need much more empirical support in order to be carried through. There is however a large amount of studies within applied linguistics that in great detail examines how difficult and rare it can to detect clear, source—target driven, metaphors in naturalistic spoken data while at the same time pointing to the widespread use of other forms of words or lexical items with a metaphorical potential (i.e., close to what we call metaphoricity; see Cameron, 2011; Zanotto, Cameron, & Cavalcanti, 2008).
METHODOLOGICAL COMMITMENTS

Central for our endeavor of re-specifying metaphor in terms of metaphoricity are five methodological points that, taken together, shape our framework for studying metaphoricity. They concern both the kinds of data that we consider best suited for studies of metaphoricity, the ways in which these data can be represented in order to be able to focus on the proper unit of study as well as specific criteria for identifying metaphoricity. The methodological points include commitments to the following areas.

Naturalistic Data

In spite of the fact that metaphor and metaphoricity in most cases are manifested and recognized when people interact with each other, they are often studied outside real interactions: in hypothetical or anecdotal forms, in written texts, or in historical or theoretical materials. Contrary to this, a focus on metaphoricity should involve a vantage point in naturalistic data (e.g., naturally occurring spoken interaction or alternatively an experimental setting simulating a “natural ecology”). The assumption behind this methodological point is that social interaction forms a key locus for the enactment of metaphoricity and, consequently, that a more comprehensive understanding of how metaphoricity is carried out in everyday interactions requires an examination of the details of interaction.

Stretches of Interaction

Following from the above, research in metaphoricity cannot be a question of how decontextualized bits and pieces of metaphorical language can be analyzed and related to a wider conceptual system. The experience of metaphorical meaning always takes place in a situation. In the words of dialogical linguist Per Linell: “All sense-making, that is, all communication and cognition, is situated . . . That is, you can never not be in a situation” (Linell, 2009, p. 49). How we enact and experience metaphoricity is bound up with the embodied, dialogical, sociocultural, and specific cognitive affordances of situated interactions. Therefore the object of study is not isolated words or single utterances, but stretches of talk, or rather stretches of whole-body interaction. Inspired by, albeit not following, conversation analysis (Hutchby & Wooffitt, 2008) we undertake a sequential analysis in which we interpret the distribution of turns as the progression of interactional affordances; why that now? is asked from a distributed, participatory viewpoint.

Discourse Data Is More Than Words

Language, as previously described, includes embodied actions of all sorts: posture, gaze, gesture, touching, facial movements, voice quality—as well as pauses and aspirations—are all equally important parts of first-order language. This of course needs to be reflected in the methodological praxis in general, and specifically for this work, in the transcribing and notation of interactional data. Basically, this means that data consists of much more than words. Even though words are of course central in working with analyses of metaphor they are, however, only but
one piece of the puzzle when it comes to metaphoricity. Following from our proposal to see metaphoricity as more fundamental than metaphor, it is mandatory to investigate metaphoricity in its totality, namely, as part and parcel of whole-body sense-making as it occurs in the flow of interaction.

**Transcriptions Combining Words With Images**

The previous point comes with a serious obligation, and huge practical challenge, of representing whole-body languaging as more than words in the transcription. This poses a serious challenge since the traditional outset for both the notion of speech acts as well as (to some degree) conversation analysis (Hutchby & Wooffitt, 1998; Searle, 1969) in fact involves words and individual talking turns. However, as noted by Per Linell (2005) and Sarah Bro Pedersen (2012), among others, a word and line based transcription (with bodily movements only appearing as comment lines) can in itself be seen as a result of a written language bias, such that this procedure (involuntarily) reflects a tradition in linguistics that endows words and verbal behavior with a certain privileged status. Nevertheless, since we cannot go back in time and be present in the flow of interaction as it took place, we need to be able to capture and represent what went on. For the sake of recognizability we combine words based transcriptions with images. Images have the advantage of favoring an in situ impression of the interaction instead of a retrospective description (as is often seen in comment lines notating bodily behavior); they show the dynamics instead of trying to explain them as in (Jensen, 2014). For these reasons the verbal transcriptions are combined with images, paving the way for an analysis of metaphoricity as embedded in whole-body languaging behavior.

**Identifying Metaphoricity In and Through Whole-Body Behavior**

A central tenet in working out a procedure for analyzing metaphoricity is of course to be able to identify metaphoricity as something distinct in the data. Our starting point for the identifying process is similar to that of the Lynne Cameron (2007) and the Pragglejaz Group (2007) in the sense that we also begin with a contrast in meaning between a particular entity and the ongoing discourse topic:

> The basic identifying features of a linguistic metaphor is the occurrence of a lexical item from a domain or semantic field different from that of the topic of the ongoing talk, together with a potential transfer or change of meaning from the new semantic field to the ongoing topic. (Cameron, 2007, p. 202)

However, unlike Cameron, we do not limit our investigation to a contrast between the meaning of words (the vehicle term and the discourse topic). Instead, following from our theoretical commitment to the languaging approach (Cowley, 2011b; Jensen, 2014; Thibault, 2011) and participatory sense-making (De Jaegher & Di Paolo, 2007), we identify metaphoricity as a special kind of contrast in behavior; this means that we are looking for observable changes in the system that have an experiential dimension. Metaphoricity is a particular type of coordination process that makes a doubleness in experience available for the participants.
Thus, we identify contrasts as much in the ongoing behavior of the interaction as in the words themselves. As self-organizing processes emerging from the inter-dynamics of human dialogue, metaphoricity cannot be reduced to, or identified in, “the words alone,” “the conceptual mappings in the head,” and certainly not “neural firings in the brain.” Rather, metaphoricity is in the \textit{in the event} as a behavioral pattern including, but not exhausted by, words as a process of coordinating interactive affordances.

\section*{DATA}

In this case, the data consist of video recordings and subsequent transcriptions of face-to-face interactions with a specific focus on how metaphoricity is enacted in the coordination of the ongoing dynamics of social interaction. Furthermore, we have deliberately picked out recordings from different ecological settings in order to gain a more general picture of how metaphoricity emerges in various situations.

All of the examples are in Danish. In the transcriptions the Danish original appears in the first line and then the English translation in the following line. The transcriptions are inspired by a basic version of the notation conventions within conversation analysis developed by Gail Jefferson (2004). A complete overview of the transcription symbols is attached as an appendix to the article. As mentioned previously, including the pictures directly related to the transcription of talking turns allows for a visual impression of the dynamics of the situations by depicting embodied actions such as posture, gaze, gesture, facial movements, and touching. However, even with the inclusion of pictures there is no such thing as all-encompassing transcription. In this case, only one camera for each recording was available and therefore the notation of facial movements and gesture is not quite as detailed as in studies focusing solely on these phenomena, which use close-ups on each participants face and hands. Still, as mentioned earlier, the primary research questions for this work concern the inter-bodily nature of metaphoricity in social interaction and not just the specific role of facial movements or gesture taken on their own.

\section*{ANALYSES}

\subsection*{Metaphoricity in Whole-Body Behavior}

Kay, Louise, and Peter all attend a Danish kindergarten for 4- to 6-year-olds. A popular learning activity in the kindergarten is the so-called emotion talks. These are led by one of the teachers who initiate the talk by showing the children a picture of another child with a distinct emotional expression. Then they all talk about the child in the picture and the emotion expressed there. The goal of these emotion talks is to get the children to articulate emotional experiences and to help them to make sense of different emotions. In this case, as shown on the pictures, the teacher presents the children with a photo of a girl with a sad expression on her face. The sequence starts just after they have talked about sad feelings relating to the photo (see Figure 1).

In looking at this example the initial expression of “a pain in the heart” naturally stands out. A more traditional cognitive semantic analysis, dealing with words only, might focus separately on the expression and categorize this as first and foremost an instance of metonymy like...
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“EFFECTS OF STATE FOR THE STATE” or “PHYSICAL AGITATION FOR THE EMOTION” (Kövecses, 2000, p. 82) combined with the conduit metaphor (“EMOTIONAL STATES ARE CONTAINED ENTITIES”). Another option would be to see this expression as a possible vehicle term (Cameron, 2007), namely, something that stands out in relation to the ongoing discourse topic. However, word-based approaches cannot capture the particular doubleness of Kay’s whole bodily performance. Nor would they address how the embodied act of metaphoricity affords joint sense making and emotional learning, which is why a restricted focus on wordings or other lexical items seems insufficient here. Instead an examination of the inter-bodily dynamics of the sequence reveals that it is not only her wordings but the totality of her embodied behavior that contrasts with the on-going languaging behavior in the sequence, and in that sense has the potential of being interpreted metaphorically.

Let us now take a closer look at the unfolding of the inter-bodily dynamics throughout the sequence. Up to the start of the sequence Kay has been sitting remarkably still alternating between gazing at the picture and sometimes the teacher. But in line 1, she suddenly shifts into a more active mode. Milliseconds before uttering, “Oh, I have a pain in the heart,” Kay flings her head back, puts her hand to her chest, opens her mouth, turns her upper body and gazes at the teacher while opening her mouth wide and making a contorted face as if in pain (see first picture in Figure 1). The teacher’s attention, however, is still on the other girl, Louise (sitting behind the boy in the picture). After not having received the attention of the teacher, Kay then repeats her turn in line 2 about having a pain in the heart, and adds, ”now that I hear about these feelings.” She thereby puts her emotional “outburst” into context, and notably at the end of this turn Kay now changes her emotional style. She smiles, gestures vividly, and gazes at the teacher as well as the other children with a playful look on her face (see second picture in Figure 1)—probably due

![Figure 1](image-url)
to the fact that she now has the teacher’s attention. Finally, at the end of the sequence in line 8, Kay again performs a whole-body expression of pain—or, more specifically, of being wounded—by leaning forward with open mouth and smiley eyes, grimacing, and opening her mouth wider and wider while saying “ouch.” Again she is performing pain.

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These whole-body actions, vividly depicting a bodily sensation of pain, also entail a distinct doubleness that connects the experience of physical pain (in the bodily movements) with sad feelings (the discourse topic). In and through this whole-body sense-making, metaphoricity is enacted as part of the on-going coordination between the participants in the discourse. Thus, the actions of Kay afford a further elaboration by Louise in line 6, when she uses the related expression, “a pain in the stomach.” In this sense, the initial actions of Kay afford a dialogical array (Hodges, 2011) in the interaction, paving the way for a further metaphorical elaboration by other participants as well. These are observable changes in the system which has an experiential dimension (i.e., the enactment of metaphoricity makes certain experiences available within the system for other participants to share and develop). These changes are emergent from the system; we therefore more precisely conceive metaphoricity as a phenomenon emerging from the dynamics in the inter-world (Linell, 2009, p. 152) between people embedded in various ecological niches (Steffensen, 2011)—in this case, the niche consists of the group at the table having the emotion talk with the picture of the girl.

Importantly, neither of the girls is employing a standard metaphor in the Lakovian sense of clearly identifiable source and target domains underlying the expression. This might suggest that, when turning to naturalistic data, the notion of metaphor is not so easy to define or detect:

Because metaphor is used in the dynamics of language and thought in action, it is inevitably multiple, various and variable, highly influenced by its context or ecology. The analyst aims to capture metaphors as they are used in the dynamics of talking-and-thinking and place them within a category labeled “metaphor”. Because each use of language can change it, the category is inevitably approximate and shifting, rather than a classical bounded category. It is perhaps most adequately seen as a fuzzy, radial category (Lakoff, 1987). It is certainly a category that is imposed on language use by scholars, not one that is pre-existing and waiting to be discovered. (Cameron, 2007, p. 115)

In this example, however, both girls clearly enact a doubleness that affords a sensible difference in experience for the participants of the interaction, i.e. metaphoricity. This points to an important insight when adopting a distributed enactive view on metaphor: In many cases, metaphoricity seems to be a much more fundamental phenomenon than metaphor; it is more present and operative in interactions than is metaphor, and it employs by definition multiple modalities that can either turn up or tone down the level of metaphoricity, as noted by Müller (2008). For that reason it is also harder to clearly identify metaphoricity as something distinct that stands out from literal speech. This problem becomes even more prominent when including whole-body behavior into the picture; it is simply harder, or perhaps even misguided, to look for source and target domains in languaging behavior, including bodily movement of all sorts. We need other criteria for metaphoricity than that of straightforward domain mappings derived from metaphor research.
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As noted previously, together, and in competition, Kay and Louise are enacting a shared experiential space in which they explore and play with the experience of sadness and pain in and through the use of metaphoricity. Treated as a whole of interbodily dynamics, the girls’ actions are co-experiential. They are elaborating on sadness by trying out conventional, as well as more unconventional, images of sadness as pain. Jointly they are appropriating new ways of understanding sadness by playing, not just with popular expressions, but with recognizable behaviors associated with the emotion of sadness too. Importantly, looking at this example there is a distinct doubleness at stake: neither of the girls is in physical pain, nor emotional pain, but in a playful way they perform or behave both. Kay in particular engages in the emotional learning by physically acting wounded and thereby metaphorically “doing sadness.” If one were to literally describe her bodily actions, or describe them out of context, what she seems to be enacting in a charades-like fashion is “wounded” or “being shot through the heart,” and the connection between “wounded” and “sad” is metaphorical. Thus there is a double meaning in the enacting of “practicing” sadness—in the imagination and play—such that the embodied enacting entail a metaphorical potential and links to the unfolding discourse context. In that sense the metaphoricity reorganizes the conversational logic via the embodied performance of direct emotional experience. We propose that such a whole-body display of metaphoricity can be coined as “UNDERSTANDING SADNESS IS PAIN PERFORMANCE.” However, such a cognitive-experiential metaphor is an analysts’ construction developed on the basis of metaphoricity.

Furthermore, the embodied behavior of the children also employs the culturally conventionalized associations between the human heart and human emotions. For centuries the heart has been used metaphorically and metonymically as a locus of human emotion—an embodied localization (Kövecses, 2000). Thus, the double meaning is also tied to the second-order constraints on the languaging behavior emerging from the way the children utilize the socio-cultural facets of the distributed cognitive system on a longer time scale. Note that appropriate (teacher-affirmed) deployment of cultural knowledge is itself a goal of the emotion talks and a value that the girls seek to realize in their participation in the dialogical system. The multiplicity of their achievements also motivates the “doubleness” of performing sadness in this context (for example, in Kay’s playful, smiling eyes when she attracts the teacher’s gaze).

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4 Whether the girls are consciously aware that they are using images of sadness as pain is hard to say. Chris Johnson (1997) has argued that young children in some cases start with conflations of experience which later become “deconflated,” allowing for mappings between what come to be understood as separate domains. Again, our point of focus is not specifically on the “deep structure” of mappings in a conceptual system, but rather on how metaphoricity enacts experience and co-experience with a potentially double nature in the here-and-now of social interaction.

5 According to ASL linguist and metaphor scholar Sarah Taub (2001), the chest location is a common source domain in conceptual metaphors for emotion in ASL. She lists “THE LOCUS OF EMOTION IS THE CHEST” and “FEELING IS TOUCHING” as metaphors, not metonymies, as the manipulation of the morphophonemic parameter of location in ASL (making a sign at or touching the chest rather than in a more neutral sign-space) means (metaphorically targets) emotion. It is relevant to our attempt to avoid the written language bias (Linell, 2005) to note that Taub’s focus on the manual modality of ASL generates the conceptual metaphor “HEART IS THE LOCUS OF EMOTION,” whereas Kövecses, looking at written language data, deems this a metonymy. Different modalities afford different kinds of sense-making.
METAPHORICITY AND GESTURE

In the first example we argued for an expansion of the traditional arena of words as the only relevant one in relation to metaphor. Instead we proposed a broader focus on metaphoricity as whole-body behavior entailing doubleness and a conception of metaphoricity as emergent from the dialogical system.

In the second example we will pursue this multi-body and multi-party view on metaphor by looking at how metaphoricity is enacted in and through gestural movements, arriving at a co-achieved emotional experience between a husband and wife. This example is from a couple’s therapy session involving a Danish couple in their mid-thirties coming to the therapy for the second time. One of the issues that often comes up during these therapy consultations is the mood swings and occasionally depressive states of the woman. Just before this sequence the therapist has asked the man to try to describe to his wife how he conceives her mood swings (see Figure 2).

Throughout the sequence clear vehicle terms can be identified through which the man enacts a metaphorical image of the woman being inside a nightmare. It is a condition and a place that she is not able to get out of on her own. Instead he has to help her out. Obviously these expressions can be described and categorized using CMT to identify the use of a container metaphor combined with “MENTAL STATES ARE PHYSICAL LOCATIONS.” This description however, is only half of the story. Again the outset in a word-based analysis needs to be combined and expanded with the details of the inter-bodily dynamics that can unravel the workings of metaphoricity, in this case a more specific focus on gesture. However, it is important to bear in mind that our view of metaphoricity as an emergent kind of coordination implies a claim: a convergence of interacting

elements and levels in a dialogical system may give rise to coordinations that are more or less metaphorical and thus to experiences that are more or less metaphorically afforded. Our aim is not to identify a metaphoric gesture in abstraction from this holistic convergence, for example on the basis of a metaphorical mapping analysis that may be carried out for the co-present speech. Rather, the metaphoricity of a gesture in our analysis has to do with the way gesturing contributes to a coordination process characterized by doubleness.

A noticeable and unusual cognitive-emotional result of the sequence is that the woman in the end in line 5 quietly sobs and starts crying (see last picture in Figure 2). This is a highly emotional action that is closely tied to the embodied use of metaphoricity in the interaction. In order to unravel the relation between the enactment of metaphoricity and the emotional experience, let us look at the gestural level more closely. In the first line on the first half of the word “nightmare” the man makes an iconic gesture of a slightly curved movement, halfway drawing a circle with his right hand (see first picture in Figure 2). He enacts the image of a contained closed space and thereby in and through his gesture enacts his experiencing of his partner’s depression so that it becomes more shareable. This image of a confined space, however, is combined with a very different gestural movement by the man later in the sequence as shown in the second picture of Figure 2. In the pause in line 2 the man extends his right arm towards his wife, forms his hand into a fist, and then with a fast movement retracts his arm and fist. Just before this gestural movement the man has talked about how he perceives his wife as immobile; not able to get out of her nightmare space. Now he physically reaches out and into a space between them and almost “grabs” onto something in there and then swiftly pulls it out. As in the previous example the bodily movements anticipates the words (Kendon, 1972, 1980). The man’s gesture reveals a retraction more than a second before he says “get out of it” in line 3. It is whole body cognizing in the fast interactional flow that characterizes first-order languaging.6

METAPHORICITY AS EMOTIONAL CO-EXPERIENCE

This development in gesture amplifies the metaphoricity by enacting a multiplicity in meaning, which in turn seems to enable the couple to go deeper in their emotional co-experience. In his gesturing, the man not only “sketches” the metaphor of their relationship but also “enters” and inhabits it, thereby enacting his experience of his wife’s depression in a conversation-scene that she is at that moment also experiencing. Just after the man’s reaching gesture, the woman’s face slightly changes quality towards crying and, as depicted in the third picture of Figure 2, in the following pause she closes her eyes and covers her face with both of her hands. Via her embodied behavior of covering of her eyes thereby creating a similar confined dark space with her hands, the woman reflects and affirms her partner’s metaphorical image of being trapped in a nightmare.7

6Furthermore, the change in gesture from line 1 to 2 reveal a switch in how the man perceives himself from an observer view-point to a character view-point (McNeill, 1992; see also Parrill, 2009, 2010). In the former the man enacts the nightmare scene as a confined space he can describe as an observer standing outside of it. By contrast, in the latter his gesturing positions him as an active agent or character who, so to speak, enters the nightmare space in trying to get his wife out while a passive agency for the woman caught in the nightmare is implied.

7Of course this gesture might also work as an act of self-protection creating a confined personal space for the woman.
Thus, the verbal and gestural depiction of his attempt (and failure) to get her out of the nightmare space affords her crying; it affords a noticeable change within the dialogical system.

In this case, a co-experiencing emerges between the two as his experience is reflected in her embodied emotional behavior. In short, he describes, and on a gestural level visualizes, her experience and his own part in it while she, on the other hand, experiences herself via his embodied understanding of her. Again this can be seen as an example of how metaphoricity, if successful, continues to re-organize the ongoing interactional flow as it develops, enabling the participants to move together towards a changed meaning in the dialogical system. Put simply, the metaphoricity works via doubleness, enacting another point of view. Furthermore, at the end of the sequence this co-experience deepens as the woman sobs while the facial quality of the man alters towards crying too. The orientation of the emotional enactment of metaphoricity becomes bidirectional, allowing for a complex double-empathy which reaches its climax in the end of the sequence: as depicted in the last picture of Figure 2, the therapist reaches out and lays her hand on the woman’s shoulder as an act of comfort but at the same time also facilitating the co-experience marked by the yellow circle in the picture encompassing all three participants.

Notably, this co-experiential result seems to be an important and sought-out aspect of the process of couples’ therapy. Presumably before the session each party was locked in their own experience of the problems in the relationship or the problems with the other. In and through the metaphoricity in this interaction, however, they achieve a meeting in experience. In the flow of inter-bodily and multimodal discourse the couple co-creates a place of co-experience in which they are both enabled to experience themselves in the other’s experience. In other words, a distributed cognitive-emotional system emerges from the metaphoricity which in turn affords the opportunity to re-live and co-experience emotions together. It is not only metaphors we live by, it is metaphors that we co-experience by.

**FINAL REMARKS**

**Outcomes and Perspectives of the Analyses**

The analyses are informed by new tendencies within the cognitive sciences in which the notion of cognition transcends the traditional domain of the individual. Following these tendencies, we move from embodied cognition to inter-bodily cognition. In this view, cognition is seen as developed between multiple participants, distributed on different timescales and deeply intertwined with the environment. Cognition is not envisioned as a deep underlying (and individual) structure that manifests itself in language and behavior; instead cognition is enacted within a dialogical system that leads to certain outputs. In the words of Giere (2007):

> A distributed cognitive system is a system that produces cognitive outputs, just as an agricultural system yields agricultural products. The operation of a cognitive system is a cognitive process. There is no difficulty in thinking that the whole system, no matter how large, is involved in the process. (p. 318)

Relating this approach to the study of metaphor, we can speak of metaphoricity as a phenomenon that both emerges from and creates changes (outputs) within a dialogical system. As noted in a recent publication: “Far from just being the expression of a physically reductionist, solipsistic embodied experience, conceptual metaphors become resources, which are evolved and deployed
in a distributed cognitive arena” (Fusaroli & Morgagni, 2013, p. 6). In this article we have argued for the notion of metaphoricity as aptly targeting a special type of coordinatting that takes place in interactions. This type of coordinating is characterized by doubleness; what metaphoricity does is to reorganize a system through this doubleness until new/different experiences are made available.

We proceeded in the analyses by looking for clusters of doubleness or multiplicity in self-organizational interactional sequence sense-making that include multiple modalities/aspects of whole-body languaging happening at once or in one concentration of activity. These clusters are cued by features such as (a) a change in position (role play, performance, taking on a perspective); (b) an embodied change in behavior and point of view; (c) a change in discourse; (d) a change in felt sense (affectivity and expressivity); and (e) an increase in the enactment of different modalities. All of these elements (and possibly many more) can foreground (or downplay) and intensify (or downgrade) the level of metaphoricity in the course of interaction (i.e., metaphoricity is a gradual phenomenon, not an either-or phenomenon).

The analyses point to metaphoricity as emerging from a convergence of interacting elements and levels in a dialogical system that give rise to coordinations that are more or less metaphorical and thus to experiences that are more or less metaphorically afforded. As stated in the first part of the article, we proposed that:

1. Metaphoricity can be seen as more fundamental and more operative than metaphor when the target of analysis is languaging interactions.
2. If metaphoricity is successful or continues to organize the interactional sequence, participants move together towards a changed meaning (the “contrast” or “non-literal” sense of traditional metaphor theory).

In the first example is was particularly clear that the object of study was not a “full-blown” (source-target) metaphor; instead we focused on contrasting behaviors and expressions comprising a distinct doubleness that further afforded new ways of understanding sadness as pain in the dialogical system. The doubleness came about as a double layer in the behavioral pattern; at the same time there was and was not heartache, heartache was in turn is a vehicle for sadness, and this vehicle was expanded and changed by another participant into stomachache working as an alternative vehicle for the same emotion. The doubleness was furthermore enacted vis-à-vis the temporal and semiotic links between multiple modalities: gesturing at the chest (where the “literal” heart is located), making a funny face (only playing, not having a heart attack), and using conventionally metaphorical wordings (but presumably not using them to target one’s own experience, despite the verbalizing of a first-person indexical in both cases). In that sense metaphoricity was detectable in the way the participants moved towards a changed meaning re-organizing the dialogical system.

In the couple’s therapy example, we witnessed a more traditional (source-target) metaphor. Still, this metaphor was embedded in the way gesturing contributed to a coordination process characterized by the gesture-driven enactment of a nightmare space that afforded a doubleness in perspective and role: The man could both describe (as an observer) and inhabit (as an actor/co-experiencer) his wife’s emotional and psychological world. First he was outside (sketching the space with his hands), and then directly engaged from “within” the scene (trying to pull his wife out of her nightmare space). Covering her face and crying, the woman was at once responding to her husband’s current conversational contribution and suffering in her nightmare imprisonment. This inter-bodily metaphoricity therefore afforded a shared space of emotional co-presence in
which the husband and wife experienced how they themselves are experienced by the other. With hand movements, facial expressions, and tears each participant acted as themselves here and now and acted the part he or she is cast in the relationship dynamics under discussion. Bringing these roles into the lived exchange of the moment, co-emboding their own felt senses of past encounters, the couple experienced the doubleness ("double vision") of seeing themselves and each other through the eyes of the other.

An important analytical point derived from the analyses is that the process of metaphoricity may or may not lead to a metaphor. In our view a metaphor is first and foremost an analyst’s construction and an abstraction from patterns and events in the interactional sequence; it is the end product of a long abstraction and analytical work. As analysts we do sometimes arrive at such SOURCE-TARGET constructions but, on the other hand, sometimes we do not. However, this open ended analytical premise does not disqualify the analysis—that is if the analytical scope is expanded to include the process of metaphoricity.

**IMPLICATIONS FOR RESEARCH IN METAPHOR**

One of the great advantages and strengths of CMT is that it was developed in close alliance with the more general movements with cognitive science at that time, especially the notion of the embodied mind (M. Johnson, 1987; Lakoff, 1987). All the core tenets of CMT fit perfectly with the general notions developing within cognitive science at that time. Now, however, the cognitive sciences are changing, and these changes fundamentally challenge some of these central notions within CMT. For instance it is now becoming increasingly hard to maintain the idea of image schemas as (more or less) fixed instantiations of a wider pre-established conceptual system. In a recent publication Raymond Gibbs (2014) points to this problem:

> Image schemas may be better thought of as basins of attraction within a self-organized system involving the interplay of brains, bodies, and world. On this view, image schemas are not localized representations but emergent patterns of entire systems in action, including neural systems. They always retain their connection to people’s in-the-moment sensorimotor experience. One does not experience image schemas or conceptual metaphors by “selecting” one as opposed to another from a stored list. Image schemas and primary metaphors are “soft assembled” spontaneously given the present state of the system, the wider context, and the task at hand, such that the speaker creates an immediate construal of the bodily based idea that not understanding something is like not seeing it. (p. 30)

The position taken in this article is in many ways close to the proposal laid out by Gibbs in this quote. To elaborate on this problem, we would like to add that if we accept the idea of cognition as more than an embodied individual inner process and instead envision cognition as distributed, embedded, enacted and situated in a human environment system, then core notions such as image schemas and conceptual mappings need to be revised. But how can this be done?

One possible new way to initiate a change in the way the think about metaphor could be to rethink the idea of a conceptual system as not a linguistically informed and well established “mental organization,” but instead as a second order constraint on languaging behavior (Thibault, 2011). As explained in the theory section the apprehension of language in terms of first order languaging behavior and second order language respectively attempts to capture the activity bound character of language as its primordial feature; this is an idea that “goes hand
in hand with significant shifts in orientation in the cognitive sciences and their ongoing project to naturalize cognition. This has taken the form of a shift from classical or first-wave (internal symbol manipulation) and second-wave (connectionist) cognitive science to third-wave theories and models of embodied, embedded distributed cognition and the place of languaging behavior in these” (Thibault, 2011, p. 211). Thus, the first–second order taxonomy makes it possible to move away from the idea of a “conceptual system” as part of a pre-established system defining the scope of “language use.” Rather than understanding language as divided into system and use we can envision language as “dynamics first and symbols afterwards” (Cowley, 2011a, p. 11). Language can be seen as an activity system meaning that languaging behavior is at the same time whole-body activity in the here-and-now and a multi-scalar activity that involves a coupling with other timescales transcending the immediate present of situational activities. This dimension concerns second order patterns that originate from larger cultural dynamics of entire populations of interacting agents on longer slower cultural-historical time scales.

Our proposal is that such a theoretical reconceptualization can help anchor a new understanding of the way we interpret notions like the conceptual system or image schemas in a broader theoretical framework allowing us to see them as “basins of attraction within a self-organized system” which are “not localized representations but emergent patterns of entire systems in action” (Gibbs, 2014, p. 30). It is, however, important to note that we are defining system in terms of dialogical system, and thus including whole-body living-cognizing of multiple co-negotiating agents. In other words we emphasize seeing, thinking, speaking, acting, and sensing people as centers or nodes of that system. We do so, by rethinking language as first order behavior constrained by second order patterns and by taking an enactive perspective on life as intelligent, and cognition as co-authored in participatory sense making (Cuffari & Jensen, in press).

Such a reconsideration of CMT is of course by no means an easy or straightforward endeavor; on the contrary we think that it is still an open question whether the central tenets of CMT are actually possible to incorporate with the new undertakings in cognitive science and distributed language studies. Nor do we delude ourselves to think that the proposals and steps taken in this article can solve these problems; we do, however, hope to have contributed with a possible way forward into this new discussion which seems inevitable.

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